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Abstract—In this invited paper, we propose HealthShare –
a forward-looking approach for secure ehealth data sharing
between multiple organizations that are hosting patients’ data in
different clouds. The proposed protocol is based on a Revocable
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption scheme and allows users
to share encrypted health records based on a policy that has
been defined by the data owner (i.e. patient, a member of the
hospital, etc). Furthermore, access to a malicious or compromised
user/organization can be easily revoked without the need to
generate fresh encryption keys.
Keywords—eHealth; Security; Cloud Computing; EHR Protec-
tion; Access Control; Policies; Attribute-Based Encryption;
I. INTRODUCTION
Not many years ago, eHealth was seen as an expenditure
rather than an investment. During the last decade this has
changed significantly, to the extent that eHealth has moved
to the top of the development agenda not only for private
organizations but also for public administration bodies that
have spurred the development of eHealth. To this end, we have
seen a steady increase in research focus and funding aiming to
modernize existing healthcare systems and to provide reliable
and cost effective eHealth services [1]. As a result, nowadays
we are faced with a major technological upturn of an industry
that for many years has relied on handwritten records and now
is expanding at a phenomenal rate.
As adoption of ehealth solutions advances, new computing
paradigms - such as cloud computing - bring the potential
to improve efficiency in managing medical health records,
help reduce costs [2] and support the collaboration between
different organizations. However, placing patients’ data in
remote locations raises many concerns regarding the privacy
of users’ data.
Lately we have seen some significant developments in cloud
computing [3]. Researchers have been focusing not only on
creating efficient and flexible cloud-based services but a lot
of attention is being invested in designing systems that are
secure against various malicious behaviours and attacks. As
a result, many companies and individuals have been starting
using cloud-based services with main aim to improve their
productivity as well as the collaboration between the users.
When it comes to the health industry, many companies and
organizations have already migrated their services to the cloud.
In addition to that, many of the existing cloud-based services
are enhanced with security-related mechanisms that provide
the necessary guarantees for the protection of patients’ data.
However, there is a clear set of mechanisms that will allow
different organizations (e.g. hospitals) to host patients’ data
in different clouds in order to securely share health records.
Having such mechanisms can increase the productivity of
health practitioners since a patients medical records can be
easily transferred to a different hospital. In addition to that,
such a sharing functionality has the potential to better support
research and enhance the collaboration between specialists and
scientists that are geographically apart. This can be exhibited
by doctors who have certain specialities can be granted rights
to be able to examine records of patients that exhibit certain
symptoms. The ease of transferring patients’ medical records
between hospitals will enable the transferring of patients’ care
from one hospital to another will alleviate the requirements to
repeat investigations.
A. Our Contribution
In this invited paper, we propose HealthShare – a forward-
looking approach for secure ehealth data sharing between
multiple organizations that are hosting patients’ data in dif-
ferent clouds. The proposed protocol is based on a Revocable
Key- Policy Attribute-Based Encryption scheme and allows
users to share encrypted health records based on a policy that
has been defined by the data owner (i.e. patient, a member
of the hospital, etc). Furthermore, access to a malicious or
compromised user/organization can be easily revoked without
the need to generate fresh encryption keys. We hope that this
work will give valuable insights to the designers of cloud-
based eHealth services in order to help design and develop
mechanisms that will support data sharing in a multi-cloud
environment.
B. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II, we present important works that focus on secure
cloud storage for ehealth services and privacy-preserving data
sharing. In Section III, we present the main entities that par-
ticipate in our model and we proceed by defining the problem
statement while in Section IV, we describe the cryptographic
primitives that are needed for a proper run of the protocol.
In Section V, we introduce the threat model that we will
consider and in Section VI we describe our protocol. Finally,
in Section VII we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we present the related works that mainly
focus on the problem of secure data sharing in a cloud
environment.
In [4] authors presented DBSP – a framework for data
and operation security in Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
clouds, consisting of protocols for a trusted launch of virtual
machines and domain-based storage protection. Its security
guarantees are supported by an extensive theoretical analysis
with proofs about protocol resistance against attacks in the
defined threat model. The protocols allow trust to be estab-
lished by remotely attesting host platform configuration prior
to launching guest virtual machines and ensure confidentiality
of data in remote storage, with encryption keys maintained
outside of the IaaS domain. In addition to that, authors provide
functionality for sharing data between different domains. To
this end, they present an XML-based language framework
which enables clients of IaaS clouds to securely share data and
clearly define access rights granted to peers. The paper also
presents experimental results that demonstrate the validity and
efficiency of the proposed protocols. The experimental results
are based on an implementation of DBSP as an extension of
OpenStack, a popular open-source cloud-computing platform.
Even though the sharing functionality proposed in DBSP is
based on standard cryptographic primitives, which makes it
rather efficient, it is also considered as basic. In addition to
that, the main drawback is the fact that DBSP is using a
symmetric key to encrypt an entire disk. As a result, to give
access to a user, data owner must reveal the secret key.
Authors in [5] proposed a protocol that allows practitioners
to identify duplicate data in privacy-preserving way. More pre-
cisely, the protocol is efficient and scalable for practical uses
and allows health practitioners to remove duplicate records for
a patient without learning anything about the content of the
records. Moreover, authors conducted extensive experimental
results by using real health records. While the protocol is
focusing on a different problem, there are some similarities
with ours since in both cases health data are somehow shared
in a privacy-preserving way.
In [6] authors presented a forward-looking design for secure
storage and file sharing in cloud environments. The scheme
was based on a Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE)
scheme [7], [8], [9] that allows patients of an electronic
healthcare system to securely store encrypted versions of their
medical data and search directly on them without having to
decrypt them first. Even though the scheme offers some kind
of secure sharing it is not that flexible and efficient since it
does not rely on policies. Furthermore, even though authors
provide a discussion regarding access revocation they do not
provide a concrete and efficient solution. Hence, the protocol
is considered as inefficient for sharing large amount of data
between multiple users.
In [10], author showed how to construct a framework
for secure file sharing by using the benefits of Revocable
Attribute-Based Encryption. More precisely, the protocol is
using a Key-Policy Attribute-Based technique through which
access revocation is optimized. Moreover, author showed how
to securely and efficiently remove access to a file, for a certain
user that is misbehaving or is no longer part of a user group,
without having to decrypt and re-encrypt the original data with
a new key or a new policy.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we introduce the system model that we con-
sider by explicitly describing the main entities that participate
in our protocol. The system model of our work is built on top
of the model presented in [10]. Furthermore, we strictly define
the problem statement.
Cloud Service Provider (CSP): One of the common
models of a cloud computing platform is Infrastructure-as-a-
Service (IaaS). In its simplest form, such a platform consists
of cloud hosts which operate virtual machine guests and
communicate through a network. Often a cloud middleware
manages the cloud hosts, virtual machine guests, network
communication, storage resources, a public key infrastructure
and other resources. Cloud middleware creates the cloud
infrastructure abstraction by weaving the available resources
into a single platform. In our system model we consider a
cloud computing environment based on a trusted IaaS provider
like the one described in [11]. The IaaS platform consists of
cloud hosts which operate virtual machine guests and com-
municate through a network. In addition to that, we assume a
Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) provider, like the one described
in [8], [12], that is built on top of the IaaS platform and can
host multiple outsourced databases. Furthermore, the cloud
service provider is responsible for storing the data of users and
also providing data access. Furthermore, for the needs of this
work we assume that different organizations using different
CSP’s. To this end, we denote CS = {cs1, . . . , csm} be the
set of all available cloud service providers that are hosting an
eHealth service.
Registration Authority (RA): RA is responsible for the
registration of users. Additionally, RA has a public/private
key pair denoted as pkRA/skRA. Apart from that, RA is
responsible for generating parameters that will be used for
the proper function of the application (e.g. reveal the identity
of a misbehaving user). RA can run as a separate third party
but can be also implemented as part of the cloud platform we
described earlier.
a) Master Authority (MA): The master authority has a
master secret key MSK and a public key pk. The master key
is kept private while the public key is known to everyone.
Additionally, MA uses MSK to generate private keys for new
users.
User (u): In our scenario a user interacts with the CSP in
order to mange certain files that has access to. The operations
that a user can perform are the following: a) register to the
service, b) generate encryption keys to safely protect her data,
c) store data in the cloud, d) share data with other users by
creating certain policies using a Key Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption scheme. Furthermore, each user has a unique
identifier ui. A user ui might be also referred as data owner
when she is the one who generated a certain file. Each user
ui has a private/public key pair (pki/ski). The private key is
kept secret, while the public key is shared with the rest of
the community. These keys will be used to secure message
exchanges in the community, hence the communication lines
between parties are assumed to be secure. It is also assumed
that users knows the public keys of RA, MA and the hosts
operated by the CSP.
Problem Statement: Let CS = {cs1, . . . , csm} be the
set of all available cloud service providers that are hosting
an eHealth service. Furthermore, let Ui =
{





the set of all users that are registered through a registration
authority (RA) to a health service hsi and Uj =
{




be the set of all users that are registered to a health service
hsj . Lets assume that a user uik stores a file m to the local
storage of hsi. The problem here is to find a way to achieve
the following:
1. Keep the content of each m private against both internal
and external attacks;
2. User uik should be able to securely share m with another
user ujl ∈ Uj who has access to hsj based on a certain
policy;
3. Data owner uik should be able to efficiently revoke access
to a user ujl for a file that has shared with her. This should
not require the data owner to decrypt and re-encrypt the
file with a fresh key.
IV. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES
In this section, we introduce the notations that we use
throughout the rest of the paper as well as the threat model
that we consider.
A. Notation
In order to provide a concrete and reliable solution for the
problem described in Section III, we need to build a protocol
through which newly encrypted data will not be decryptable
by a user if that user’s access has been revoked. In addition
to that, we want to allow users with certain access rights to
be able to search directly over encrypted data. To this end,
we will be using a key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-
ABE) scheme such as the one described in [10]. In a KP-
ABE scheme every secret key is generated with a policy P
and every ciphertext is bound to a set of attributes U . Then,
decryption is only possible if P (U) = True. From now on
we will refer to the set of all available attributes as Ω =
{a1, . . . , an}, while the set of all available policies will be




CSP Cloud Service Provider
RA Registration Authority
ui A user with unique identifier i
m An arbitrary message
Enc Encryption algorithm
Dec Decryption algorithm
pki/ski Public/private key pair of user i




We now proceed with the definition of a revocable KP-ABE
scheme as described in [13].
Definition 1 (Revocable Key-Policy ABE): A revocable
KP-ABE scheme is a tuple of the following five algorithms:
1. Setup is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as in-
put a security parameter λ and outputs a public
key pk and a master key MSK. We denote this by
(pk,MSK)← Setup(1λ).
2. Gen is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a
master key, a policy P ∈ P and the unique identifier
of a user and outputs a secret key which is bind both
to the corresponding policy and user. We denote this by
(skP,ID)← Gen(MSK, P, ID).
3. Enc is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a
public key, a message m, a set of attributes S ∈
Ω and a timestamp t. After a proper run, the algo-
rithm outputs a ciphertext cS,t which is bind both to
the set of attributes and the time. We denote this by
(cS,t)← Enc(pk,m,S, t).
4. KeyUpdate is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input
a master key, a revocation list rl and a timestamp t and
outputs a key update information for time t. We denote
this by (Kt)← KeyUpdate(MSK, rl, t).
5. Dec is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a
secret key, a key update Kt′ and a ciphertext and outputs
the original message m iff the set of attributes S that are
bind to the ciphertext satisfies the policy P , t′ ≥ t and
the ID of the corresponding user was not revoked at time
t. We denote this by Dec(skP,ID,Kt′ , cS,t)→ m.
A summary of the notation introduced so far is presented
in Table I.
V. THREAT MODEL
Our threat model is similar with the one described in [4],
which is based on the Dolev-Yao adversarial model [14] and
further assumes that privileged access rights can used by a re-
mote adversary ADV to leak confidential information. ADV ,
e.g. a corrupted system administrator, can obtain remote access
to any host maintained by the IaaS provider, but cannot access
the volatile memory of guest VMs residing on the compute
hosts of the IaaS provider.
Hardware Integrity: We assume that the cloud provider
has taken all the necessary technical and non-technical mea-
sures in order to protect the underling hardware from tamper-
ing.
Physical Security: We assume physical security of the
data centres where the IaaS is deployed. This assumption
holds both when the IaaS provider owns and manages the
data center (as in the case of Amazon Web Services, Google
Compute Engine, Microsoft Azure, etc.) and when the provider
utilizes third party capacity, since physical security can be
observed, enforced and verified through known best practices
by audit organizations. This assumption is important to build
higher-level hardware and software security guarantees for
the components of the IaaS. We assume the record is kept
on protected storage with read-only access and the adversary
cannot tamper with it.
Network Infrastructure: The IaaS provider has physical
and administrative control of the network. ADV is in full con-
trol of the network configuration, can overhear, create, replay
and destroy all the exchanged messages between the CSP and
their resources (virtual machines, database components etc) as
well as with other entities that participate in our system model
(i.e. the registration authority).
Cryptographic Security: We assume encryption schemes
are semantically secure and the ADV cannot obtain the plain
text of encrypted messages. In addition to that, we explicitly
assume that the ADV cannot forge the revocation list and
cannot decrypt a ciphertext without knowing the corresponding
secret key. Furthermore, we assume that the probability of
ADV guessing a generated random number is negligible.
Finally, we explicitly exclude denial-of-service attacks [15],
[16], [17], [18] from our adversarial model and we focus on
ADV that aims to compromise the confidentiality of data by
forging existing access policies generated by the corresponding
data owners.
VI. PROTCOL DESCRIPTION (HealthShare)
In this section, we present HealthShare that constitutes the
core of this paper’s contribution. Since this is a position paper,
we will not present a formal construction of the protocol. We
will provide provide though a detailed high level description
(also see figure 1) that gives the reader a good overview of
the functionality that is offered as well as a typical use-case
scenario.
A user uik ∈ Ui registers to an electronic healthcare service
hsi through the registration authority. After the successful
registration registration, uik will receive a credential that can
use in order to store and retrieve data to the CSP csi that hsi
is using.
For simplicity, from now on when we refer to a user we will
be assuming that user is a patient. However, in our protocol the
group of users is comprised by both patients and healthcare
practitioners or any entity that has the right to store data in the
CSP. Now that uik has registered, she can start uploading files
to the CSP. Hence, we assume that uik can store the results m
of an exam on the remote storage offered by csi. To do that
in a secure and privacy-preserving way the files needs to be
transmitted and stored in an encrypted form in order to avoid
both internal and external attacks. To this end, uik contacts MA
who generates an ABE key based on a certain policy. Now that
uik received her ABE secret key she can start encrypting files.
Hence, uik encrypts m by using a set of attributes defined by
her. The attributes can be seen as access rights since only users
with keys that their policy satisfies these attributes will be able
to decrypt the data. The generated ciphertext is sent to the CSP
who cannot decrypt it since it does not have knowledge of a
valid private key – hence the content of the file remains private
even if the CSP acts maliciously.
Now that uik has stored a file in the csi, she wishes to
share it with a user ujl ∈ U| who is registered at shj and
has access to csj . To do this, u
j
l generates an ABE key by
contacting MA. This key is bound to a certain policy like
before. However, it worth mentioning that the time this key is
generated, the generation process is irrelevant to the file that
ujl wishes to access. Now that u
j
l has generated her ABE key
she can ask to access the encrypted version of m (cm) that
stored earlier by uik. this requires that csi and csj are sharing
a search function that allows users to look for stored files in
both locations. As a next step, ujl will receive cm from csi and
will try to decrypt it. However, the decryption will only work
if the attributed that are bound to cm are satisfying the policy
that is attached on ujl ’s key. In any other case the decryption
will fail and contents of m will remain private.
Apart from successfully sharing files, one of our goals is to
efficiently revoke access for a user. Having this in mind, we
assume that uik wishes to revoke access for the users u
j
l . To
do so, uik will only have to run an algorithm that will actually
revoke access for the unique key that was generated for user
ujl . Apart from that, u
i
k will not have to decrypt and then re-
encrypt the file with a fresh key since the key that is hold by
ujl will not be a valid decryption key.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this invited paper, we proposed a protocol for secure and
efficient sharing of ehealth data in a multi-cloud environment.
The proposed protocol was based on a Revocable Key-Policy
Attribute-Encryption and allowed users to control access rights
directly on encrypted data. Moreover, the proposed protocol
allows secure and efficient revocation of access to data, for a
certain user that is compromised, misbehaving or is no longer
part of a user group, without having to decrypt and re-encrypt
the original data.
As future steps, we plan to implement our protocol in order















Fig. 1. HealthShare overview
cloud environment. Furthermore, we plan to explore the incor-
poration of our protocol with mobile sensing applications and
with privacy-preserving reputation systems for cloud-based
participatory sensing applications. The envisioned system will
be based on [19], [20], [21] and will effectively maintain the
privacy and anonymity of users [22], [23].
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